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HTDet: A Clustering Method Using Information Entropy for
Hardware Trojan Detection
Renjie Lu, Haihua Shen , Zhihua Feng, Huawei Li, Wei Zhao, and Xiaowei Li
Abstract: Hardware Trojans (HTs) have drawn increasing attention in both academia and industry because of their
signiﬁcant potential threat. In this paper, we propose HTDet, a novel HT detection method using information entropybased clustering. To maintain high concealment, HTs are usually inserted in the regions with low controllability and
low observability, which will result in that Trojan logics have extremely low transitions during the simulation. This
implies that the regions with the low transitions will provide much more abundant and more important information for
HT detection. The HTDet applies information theory technology and a density-based clustering algorithm called
Density-Based Spatial Clustering of Applications with Noise (DBSCAN) to detect all suspicious Trojan logics in the
circuit under detection. The DBSCAN is an unsupervised learning algorithm, that can improve the applicability of
HTDet. In addition, we develop a heuristic test pattern generation method using mutual information to increase the
transitions of suspicious Trojan logics. Experiments on circuit benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness of HTDet.
Key words: Hardware Trojan (HT) detection; information entropy; Density-Based Spatial Clustering of Applications
with Noise (DBSCAN); unsupervised learning; clustering; mutual information; test patterns generation
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Introduction

With the development of society, security issues have
become the focus of attention, such as secure DHCPv6
mechanism, secure web, and secure authentication
protocol for mobile payment, and so on[1–5] . The
globalization of the modern Integrated Circuit (IC)
industry has also raised increasing hardware security
issues. For example, Intellectual Property (IP) cores
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provided by third parties are widely used in IC design
to reduce development cost and shorten the marketing
cycle[6] . As the third-party IP cores are designed by
outsourced vendors, an adversary can easily implement
some malicious logics, referred to as Hardware Trojans
(HTs), into IP cores.
HTs are lightweight structures in large-scale IC
designs, which commonly contain two components:
Trojan trigger and Trojan payload[7] . The Trojan trigger
is responsible for monitoring signals to determine
whether the trigger signal has arrived. If the Trojan
trigger is not activated, HTs stay dormant and
do not affect the original circuit. If the Trojan
trigger is activated, the Trojan payload will perform
speciﬁc malicious operations, such as changing
functionality, degrading performance, and revealing
secret information[8] . Since most of HTs usually have
extremely rare trigger conditions, it is very challenging
to detect suspicious Trojan logics in the Circuit Under
Detection (CUD).
The existing HT detection techniques can be
roughly classiﬁed into six major groups: reverse
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engineering[9–11] , side-channel analysis[12–18] , GateLevel Information Flow Tracking (GLIFT)[19–21] , static
structure analysis[22–27] , statistical feature analysis[28–32] ,
and functional testing[33–36] . In reverse engineering, a
fabricated chip is completely dissected layer-by-layer in
order to reconstruct the IC design to detect malicious
modiﬁcations. Reverse engineering approaches consume
prohibitively high cost, and it is impossible to carry
out reverse engineering for each chip under test. In
side-channel analysis, the impacts of HTs on circuit
delay, transient current, and leakage power, and so
on, can be used to detect whether there are the HTs
in CUD. Side-channel analysis approaches can detect
HTs inserted in the post-fabrication stage. However,
side-channel analysis usually requires a “golden circuit”
for impact comparison and also it is susceptible to
process variations or environmental noise, which can
result in many false positives. GLIFT-based Trojan
detection techniques rely on gate-level information ﬂow
tracking to detect Trojans. To account for hardware
speciﬁc information ﬂow, the GLIFT technique tracks
information ﬂow through Boolean gates. At the gate
level, all information ﬂow appears at the most basic
level of abstraction which allows detecting information
ﬂow that is inherently not visible at the software level.
Like software virus detection technique, static structure
analysis methods detect HTs by analyzing the circuit
structure characteristics. Although the static structure
analysis is an effective HT detection approach, it can
only detect known types of HTs. Intrinsic differences
exist between Trojan logics and normal circuit; therefore,
statistical feature analysis approaches can be used
to detect potential HTs in CUD. Functional testing
approaches try to generate test vectors to activate
potential HTs and propagate HTs’ effects on the primary
outputs. Although functional testing is independent of
process variations and environmental noise, it usually
consumes a signiﬁcant amount of time due to the high
concealment of HTs.
The key insight of our approach is that HTs are usually
inserted in the regions with low controllability and low
observability in order to maintain high concealment,
which will result in Trojan logics featuring extremely
low transitions during the simulation. In the ﬁeld of
information theory, if an event is improbable, much
more information will be provided when the event
happens; that is, the logical regions with the very low
transitions will provide us with much more abundant
and more important information for Trojan detection. In
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this paper, we propose a novel HT detection method
using information entropy-based clustering, calld HTDet.
First, digital stimuli are generated for the CUD. Then
the information entropy of the signal sequence of each
wire is calculated, and a typical density-based clustering
algorithm called Density-Based Spatial Clustering of
Applications with Noise (DBSCAN) is applied to detect
all suspicious Trojan logics. Furthermore, a heuristic test
pattern generation method using mutual information is
developed to increase the transitions of these suspicious
Trojan logics. In summary, this paper has the following
contributions.
 To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst attempt
to use information entropy technology to detect HTs
in the hardware design, and the proposed HTDet can
achieve good experimental results.
 An unsupervised learning algorithm, DBSCAN,
is used for Trojan detection, which means that HTDet
does not require “golden circuit”. Furthermore, HTDet
does not need to trigger Trojan logics. As long as the
information entropy of the circuit logic is extremely low,
HTDet can detect them based on the density-reachable
relationship.
 We develop a heuristic test pattern generation
method using mutual information technology to increase
the transitions of suspicious Trojan logics.
 We conducted lots of evaluations on TrustHub
benchmarks[37] , which showed that HTDet can
effectively detect suspicious Trojan logics with
negligible false positives.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sections
2 and 3 introduce the theoretical basis and the threat
model, respectively. We present the methodology of
the HTDet in detail in Section 4. Section 5 presents
the test pattern generation method for suspicious Trojan
logics. Experimental analysis is presented in Section 6.
Section 7 brieﬂy summarizes the related works. Finally,
we conclude this paper in Section 8.

2

Theoretical Basis

In this paper, we perform the HT detection using
information theory technology[38] . In this section, we
provide the theoretical basis of the proposed approach.
2.1

Information entropy

Information entropy is also known as the selfinformation, which is the average rate at which
information is produced by a data source. Entropy
is a measure of uncertainty associated with a random
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variable.
Let X be a discrete random variable, and its
probability distribution be consistent with p.x/ D
P .X D x/, where x 2 X ; hence, the entropy H.X / of
X can be explicitly written as
X
H.X/ D 
p.x/ logb p.x/
(1)
x2X

where b is the base of the logarithm used. In this paper,
b is equal to the mathematical constant e. In the case of
p.x/ D 0, the value of 0 logb 0 is taken to be 0, which
is consistent with the limit,
lim

p.x/!0C

2.2

p.x/ logb p.x/ D 0

(2)

Joint entropy

In information theory, joint entropy is a measure of the
uncertainty associated with a set of variables. In this
paper, we focus on the joint entropy of two random
variables.
Similarly, let X and Y be two discrete random
variables, and their probability distribution be p.x; y/,
where x 2 X and y 2 Y ; hence, the joint entropy
H.X; Y / of X and Y can be presented as
XX
H.X; Y / D 
p.x; y/ logb p.x; y/
(3)

2.4

2
p.x/ 4

x2X



XX

X

3
p.yjx/ logb p.yjx/5 D

y2Y

p.x; y/ logb p.yjx/

(4)

It is worth noting that H.X/, H.X; Y /, and H.Y jX /
can conform to the chain rule, that is
XX
H .X; Y / D 
p.x; y/ logb p.x; y/ D


x2X y2Y

p.x; y/ logb Œp.x/p.yjx/ D

x2X y2Y



XX

x2X y2Y

Mutual information

The mutual information of two variables is a measure of
the mutual dependence between the variables. More
speciﬁcally, the mutual information quantiﬁes the
amount of information obtained about one random
variable by observing the other random variable.
Let X and Y be two discrete random variables, and
their joint probability distribution be p.x; y/; hence, the
mutual information I.X I Y / between X and Y can be
deﬁned as
XX
p.x; y/
p.x; y/ logb
(6)
I.X I Y / D
p.x/p.y/
x2X y2Y

According to the relationships among probability
distributions and the chain rule, I.XI Y / can also be
expressed as
XX
p.xjy/
I.X IY / D
D
p.x; y/ logb
p.x/
x2X y2Y
XX
p.x; y/ Œlogb p.xjy/  logb p.x/ D
x2X y2Y

H.X / C H.Y /  H.Y; X /

x2X y2Y

XX

(5)

H.X /  H.X jY / D

In information theory, the conditional entropy quantiﬁes
the amount of information needed to describe the
outcome of a random variable Y when the value of
another random variable X is known.
The entropy H.Y jX / of Y conditioned on X can be
deﬁned as follows,
X
H.Y jX/ D
p.x/H.Y jX D x/ D
X

p.x; y/ logb p.yjx/ D

x2X y2Y

H.X / C H.Y jX /

Conditional entropy

x2X

XX

p.x/ logb p.x/

x2X

x2X y2Y

2.3

X



p.x; y/ Œlogb p.x/ C logb p.yjx/ D

3

(7)

Threat Model

The threat model of the proposed method is based on
several assumptions.
 With the globalization of chip design, the
adversaries can have more opportunities to insert HTs
into a digital circuit design than before. It can be the
gate-level netlist or register transfer language.
 Our threat model assumes that the given hardware
design is in the form of a digital circuit design.
 The goal of the attack is to change functionality,
destroy the IC, and/or leak secret information through
logical attack, rather than through side-channels such as
current, power, or electromagnetism.

4

HTDet Methodology

In this section, ﬁrst, we provide the feasibility analysis
of HTDet. Then the technical details of HTDet are
presented. The core problem is whether the information
entropy technology and clustering algorithm can be used
to effectively detect suspicious Trojan logics in the CUD.
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Feasibility analysis

The key insight of HTDet is that the signiﬁcant
differences exist between the Trojan logics and the
rest of the circuit. More speciﬁcally, the HT is usually
inserted in the regions with low controllability and low
observability, which causes the Trojan logic to have a
very low transition probability. Moreover, in the ﬁeld of
information theory[38] , if an event is very probable, little
information is provided when it happens. Conversely, if
an event is improbable, much more information will be
provided when it happens.
That is, the regions with low transitions will provide us
with more abundant and more important information for
HT detection. However, directly applying the transition
probability for Trojan detection will result in high false
positives. For example, we consider that the signal wires
(from W1 to W14 ) have the transition probabilities listed
in Table 1.
Due to the density-reachable relationship between low
transition probabilities and high transition probabilities,
signal wires from W1 to W10 can be reported as
suspicious Trojan logics as shown in Fig. 1 (blue line),
while the use of information entropy can signiﬁcantly
reduce false positives. As shown in Fig. 1 (orange line),
signal wires from W1 to W7 can be reported as suspicious
Trojan logics.
This is because the information entropy can cause
a gap in the connectivity between low transition
probabilities and high transition probabilities, and it is
more sensitive to low transition probabilities as shown
in Fig. 2. It can be seen that the density-reachable
relationship between signal wires (from W1 to W7 )
is much closer than the density-reachable relationship
between low transition probabilities and high transition
Table 1 Signal wires and corresponding transition
probabilities.
Wire Transition probability Wire Transition probability
1
1
W1
W8
1000
20
1
1
W2
W9
800
10
1
1
W10
W3
500
8
1
1
W11
W4
200
5
1
3
W5
W12
100
10
1
1
W6
W13
80
2
1
6
W14
W7
50
10

Fig. 1 HT detection comparison between transition
probability and information entropy.

Fig. 2 Distribution of information entropy for probabilities
listed in Table 1.

probabilities.
It has been proven that the information entropy takes
the maximum value when p.transition/ is equal to
p.non-transition/. In other words, when p.transition/ D
p.non-transition/ D 0.5, the corresponding information
entropy can take the maximum value. According to Eq.
(1), the transition probability-information entropy curve
is shown in Fig. 3. Because the information entropy
has symmetry, the minimum value can be taken when

Fig. 3

Transition probability-information entropy curve.

Tsinghua Science and Technology, February 2021, 26(1): 48–61

52

p.transition/ D 0 or p.transition/ D 1. Based on this
conclusion, we should exclude the noise data that have
very low information entropy due to very high transition
probability.
In addition, the mutual information technology can
measure the correlations between primary inputs and
internal signal wires, which is beneﬁcial to test patterns
generation. Therefore, we ﬁrst propose applying the
information theory technology in the ﬁeld of HT
detection.
4.2

Application of information entropy

To apply the information entropy technology for HT
detection, we ﬁrst use functional testing to generate
digital stimuli for the CUD. We believe that the set of test
patterns developed during design veriﬁcation can satisfy
this step. The goal of this step is to perform functional
testing for the CUD with high coverage as much as
possible. After the functional testing, we can obtain the
original waveform of each signal wire in the CUD, which
contains only binary values (0 or 1). Our goal is to use
the information entropy to evaluate the controllability
and observability of each circuit logic such that we can
effectively distinguish Trojan logics from the rest of the
circuit.
However, we cannot directly use the original
waveform for HT detection. For example, the signal
transition occurs only once in OW1 , while OW2 has
ﬁve signal transitions, as shown in Fig. 4a. Because
the HTs usually are inserted in the regions with low
controllability and low observability, which cause the
Trojan logic to have a very low transition probability.
Hence, the logical region of OW1 , rather than that of
OW2 , is more likely to be a Trojan logic. However,
because the probabilities of 0 and 1 in OW1 are the same
as in OW2 , the information entropies of both OW1 and
OW2 are 0.6931 according to Eq. (1).
We should focus on the distribution of signal
transitions rather than the distribution of 0 and 1 such
that we can use the information entropy to evaluate the
ow =<0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,1,1>
ow =<0,0,0,1,0,1,0,1,1,1>
1

2

controllability and observability of each circuit logic. To
this end, we encode the original waveform according
to the following rules. We assume that the original
waveform OW = hs1 ; s2 ; : : : ; sn ; snC1 i. For each signal
pair hsi ; si C1 i, i D 1; 2; : : : ; n; if hsi ; si C1 i D h0; 0i,
we encode si as 0; if hsi ; si C1 i D h0; 1i, we encode
si as 1; if hsi ; si C1 i D h1; 0i, we encode si as 1; if
hsi ; siC1 i D h1; 1i, we encode si as 0. The encoded
waveforms of the original waveforms (OW1 and OW2 )
are shown in Fig. 4b. Then, we use Eq. (1) to calculate
the information entropy of each encoded waveform.
The information entropy of Encode1 (corresponding
to OW1 ) is approximately equal to 0.3488, and the
information entropy of Encode2 (corresponding to OW2 )
is approximately equal to 0.6870, which is more in line
with the expected results.
We apply the information entropy to distinguish the
differences between Trojan logics and the normal circuit.
As shown in Fig. 5, we can obtain the information
entropy of each wire in the given circuit after functional
testing (106 cycles). It can be seen that the information
entropy at the output of the AND gate is 0.138 20, that
at the input (top) of the AND gate is 0.229 66, and
that at the input ( bottom) of the AND gate is 0.662 71
due to different circuit structures. Lots of experiments
demonstrated that the information entropy of each wire
was almost consistent with the controllability measure[39]
of this signal wire.
4.3

HT detection-based clustering

It is worth noting that our circuit analysis focuses
on the states of internal wires in CUD rather than
circuit structures. For convenience of discussion, we
deﬁne CUD = hPI; W; POUTi, where PI is the set of
primary inputs, W is the set of internal signal wires, and
POUT is the set of primary outputs. More formally,
PI D fpi1 ; pi2 ; : : : ; pil g, W D fw1 ; w2 ; : : : ; wm g, and
POUT D fpout1 ; pout2 ; : : : ; poutn g. After functional
testing, we encode each original waveform of CUD
and calculate the information entropy of each encoded
0.69314
0.69314
0.69314



(a) Original waveform OW1 and OW2

Encode1=<0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0>



0.69314
0.69314

Fig. 4 Comparison between original waveform and encoded
waveform.




Encode2=<0,0,1,1,1,1,1,0,0>
(b) Encoded waveform Encode1 and Encode2



0.69314

Fig. 5 Information entropy of each wire in the given circuit
fragment.

Renjie Lu et al.:

HTDet: A Clustering Method Using Information Entropy for Hardware Trojan Detection

waveform. Once the above step is complete, we apply
a typical density-based clustering algorithm called
DBSCAN[40] to perform HT detection in the information
entropy space composed by W and POUT.
In the given data space, the density is deﬁned as the
number of data points within a speciﬁed radius (r), and
the core point has more than the speciﬁed number of
data points (MinPts) within its r-neighborhood, and
the border point has less than MinPts within its rneighborhood, but it is in the r-neighborhood of a core
point, and any point that is not a core point or border
point is called a noise point. Moreover, date point q is
directly density-reachable from another point p, if p is a
core point and q is within the r-neighborhood of p. Data
point q is density-reachable from another point p, if there
is a path of points p1 .p/ ! p2 !    ! pn1 ! pn .q/
such that point piC1 is directly density-reachable from
point pi . Data points p and q are density-connected,
if there is a data point o, such that both p and q are
density-reachable from o.
The basic idea of the DBSCAN is to ﬁnd the maximal
set of density-connected points. In other words, all
points within the same cluster are mutually densityconnected. Algorithm 1 shows the clustering process in
Algorithm 1 HT detection-based clustering
Input: Information Entropy Space (IES), r, MinPts
Output: Suspicious Trojan logics
1: function F IND C ORE P OINT (IES; r; MinPts)
2:
C D0
3:
for 8 unvisited point P 2 IES do
4:
mark P as visited
5:
NeighborPts
all points within P ’s r-neighborhood
6:
if size of NeighborPts < MinPts then
7:
mark P as noise point
8:
else
9:
C D next cluster
10:
Clustering(P , NeighborPts, C , r, MinPts)
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:

function C LUSTERING(P , NeighborPts, C , r, MinPts)
add P to cluster C
for 8 point Q 2 NeighborPts do
if Q is not visited then
mark Q as visited
Q NPts
all points within Q’s r-neighborhood
if size of Q NPts  MinPts then
NeighborPts
NeighborPts [ Q NPts

53

the information entropy space.

5

Test Patterns Generation for Suspicious
Trojan Logics Using Mutual Information

As described in Section 4, the proposed HT detection
method can ﬁnd suspicious Trojan logics. This section
introduces a heuristic test pattern generation method
using mutual information, which can further increase the
transitions of suspicious Trojan logics. As is depicted
in Fig. 6, the correlation between each suspicious
Trojan logic and each primary input is measured by
the mutual information. If the mutual information is
greater than the threshold, the corresponding primary
input is strongly correlated to this suspicious Trojan
logic and is referred to as Strongly Correlated Primary
Input (SCPI). Therefore, each suspicious Trojan logic
will maintain a Set of SCPI (SSCPI). Then, a heuristic
method is developed to select minimum SCPIs while
covering all suspicious Trojan logics.
5.1

Feasibility analysis

In the ﬁeld of information theory, the mutual information
between X and Y can measure the mutual dependence
between the two variables; that is, the mutual
information can measure the correlation between two
variables[41] . If X and Y are independent, their mutual
information is zero. If X is a deterministic function of
Y .Y also is a deterministic function of X), knowing the
value of X can determine the value of Y and vice versa.
In this case, the mutual information between X and Y is
the same as the H.X / and as the H.Y /:
Naturally, each circuit logic can be expressed as a
Boolean function of different primary inputs, which
conforms to the statement of the correlation. For
3URSRVHG+7
GHWHFWLRQPHWKRG
&OXVWHU
&RUUHODWLRQ
6XVSLFLRXV7URMDQ FDOFXODWLRQ
ORJLFV

3ULPDU\LQSXWV

/ist of
SSCPI

if Q is not yet member of any cluster then
add Q to cluster C
function R EPORT T ROJANS(all clusters)
Report the cluster with lowest average information
entropy as suspicious Trojan logics.

0LQLPXP6&3,V

Fig. 6

Overview of test pattern generation method.
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example, we can obtain three Boolean functions d D ab,
e D c, and f D ab C c for the circuit structure shown
in Fig. 7. Hence, we can know that d and c, e and a,
and e and b are independent, such that their mutual
information must be zero, and e is a deterministic
function of c, such that their mutual information is the
same as H.c/ and H.e/, and the mutual information
I.d I a/ should be equal to the mutual information
I.d I b/, because they are of the same circuit logic. It
is worth noting that the mutual information I.f I a/ is
different from the mutual information I.f I c/, because
they are of different circuit logics (AND gate and
inverter). In short, the higher the mutual information
of two variables, the stronger the variables correlation.
5.2

Correlation
information

calculation

using

mutual

We consider that the set of primary inputs PI D fpi1 ;
pi2 ; : : : ; pil g, and consider that the set of suspicious
Trojan logics SW D fsw1 ; sw2 ; : : : ; sw t g, where
t  m C n. First, we calculate mutual information
I.swi ; pij ) between each suspicious Trojan logic
swi and each primary input pij , where i D 1; 2;
: : : ; t and j D 1; 2; : : : ; l: According to Eq. (7),
I.swi I pij / D H.swi / C H.pij /  H.pij ; swi ).
Because each encoded waveform only contains
0 (non-transition) and 1 (transition), H.pij ; swi / D
P
P
 pij 2f0; 1g swi 2f0; 1g p.pij ; swi / logb p.pij ; swi /,
according to Eq. (3). If I.swi ; pij ) is greater than
the threshold, we refer to the primary input pij as the
SCPI of suspicious Trojan logic swi . For each swi ,
I.swi I pij /
P
the threshold is equal to pij 2PI
, where l
l
is the number of primary inputs. Finally, each suspicious
Trojan logic will have an SSCPI. The strong correlations
between primary inputs and suspicious Trojan logics can
constitute a strong correlation list, as shown in Table 2.
5.3

Our goal is to select the minimum number of SCPIs
while
˚  covering all suspicious Trojan logics. We deﬁne
pij to be a set of suspicious Trojan logics whose
D
G

F

H

SSCPI includes pij , and deﬁne the “+” operation
between sets is equivalent to the “union” operation
between sets, while the “-” operation between sets
is equivalent to the “difference” operation between
sets. For example, fpi1 g D fsw1 ; sw t g, fpil g D
fsw1 ; sw2 ; sw t g, fpi1 g + fpil g D fsw1 ; sw2 ; sw t g, and
fpil g – fpi1 g D fsw2 g. Therefore, the problem can be
abstracted as the following formula, where xj 2 f0; 1g.
If pij is selected, xj D 1; otherwise xj D 0.
X
xj
min
s: t:

I

Fig. 7 Mutual information analysis for given circuit
structure.

X

xj 2f0;1g

˚ 
xj  pij D SW

(8)

pij 2PI

8
ˆ
ˆ
<min ff .k 1; y/; f .k 1; y fpik g/C1g ;
f .k; y/ D
if fpik g  yI
ˆ
:̂f .k  1; y/;
otherwise
(9)
We develop a heuristic method to solve this problem.
Here, f .k; y/ indicates the optimal solution when
PI D fpi1 ; : : : ; pik g and SW D y. As shown in Eq. (9),
f .l; SW/ is the optimal solution of Eq. (8). Then we
perform constrained-random simulation, setting all the
primary input at logic 0 or logic 1, which is not in SCPIs.
For the rest of the primary inputs in SCPIs, we still
generate full-random stimuli to perform simulation.

6

Test patterns generation

E

Table 2 Strong correlation list: 1 indicates pij is an SCPI of
swi and 0 indicates not.
PI
SW
pi1
pi2
pi3

pil
sw1
1
0
1

1
0
1
1

1
sw2
::
::
::
::
::
::
:
:
:
:
:
:
1
1
0

1
sw t

Experiments and Evaluations

The HTDet was evaluated on different digital circuit
designs from the TrustHub benchmark[37] . All circuits
were synthesized by Synopsys Design Compiler
(DC) with Semiconductor Manufacturing International
Corporation cell library for 90-nm silicon-on-insulator
process. All circuits were simulated by Verilog compiler
simulator with a high coverage. We conducted data
processing experiments and data analysis experiments
on a computer with 2.8 GHz Intel Core i7 CPU and 8 GB
memory[42] . Brief information about the benchmarks
used in our experiments is provided in Table 3.
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Circuit
RS232 T1000
RS232 T1100
RS232 T1200
RS232 T1300
RS232 T1400
RS232 T1500
RS232 T1600
s15850 T100
s35932 T200
s38417 T100
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Table 3
Number of units
215
217
216
213
215
216
214
2182
5438
5341

55

Brief information of the circuits under detection.
Features of HT
Trojan trigger is a combinational comparator; change functionality
Trojan trigger is a sequential comparator; change functionality
Trojan trigger is a sequential comparator; change functionality
Trojan trigger is a combinational comparator; change functionality
Trojan trigger is a sequential comparator; change functionality
Trojan trigger is a sequential comparator; change functionality
Trojan trigger is a sequential comparator; change functionality
Trojan trigger consists of two comparators and two ﬂip-ﬂops; leak an internal signal
Trojan trigger is a comparator; denial of service
Trojan trigger is a comparator; change functionality, denial of service

Clustering comparison between information
entropy space and transition probability space

In our experiments, HTDet could detect all suspicious
Trojan logics in the CUD. Taking RS232 T1000 and
RS232 T1100 as examples, we present the differences
of clustering between the information entropy space
and transition probability space. Figures 8a and 8b
show the results of clustering using information entropy
for RS232 T1000 and RS232 T1100 benchmarks,
respectively.
According to Algorithm 1, the cluster with the lowest
average information entropy is reported as suspicious
Trojan logics. As shown in Fig. 8, although HTDet

could differentiate the information entropy space into
several clusters (the points of the same color represent
the same cluster), the circuit logics with extremely low
information entropy were always divided into one cluster
according to the density-reachable relationship.
Similarly, we also used transition probability for
Trojan detection. Figures 9a and 9b show the results
of clustering for RS232 T1000 and RS232 T1100,
respectively.
It can be seen that the use of transitions will result in
high false positives. However, the information entropy
can effectively distinguish the Trojan logics from the
normal circuit. To have more insight on the difference

(a) Clustering for RS232 T1000 benchmark

(a) Clustering for RS232 T1000 benchmark

(b) Clustering for RS232 T1100 benchmark

Fig. 8

Clustering in information entropy space.

(b) Clustering for RS232 T1100 benchmark

Fig. 9

Clustering in transition probability space.
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between information entropy and transition probability,
we sorted the information entropy space and transition
probability space of the RS232 T1000 benchmark from
lowest to highest. The distributions of information
entropy and transition probability are illustrated in
Fig. 10.
As shown in Fig. 10a, the area with low information
entropy (red) and other areas (green) have a clear
density-unreachable relationship. However, the area
with low transition probability and other area are
still density-reachable (red), as shown in Fig. 10b,
which will lead to poor Trojan detection. Because the
information entropy can amplify the difference between
low transition probability and high transition probability,
it can effectively detect suspicious Trojan logics.
6.2

HT detection performance and parameter
analysis

To further evaluate the effectiveness of the HTDet, we
manually checked the suspicious Trojan logics reported
by Algorithm 1. The results are presented in Table 4.
MinPts and r are the parameters used in the clustering
process.
The sensitivity of the results is measured by the True

(a) Distribution of information entropy

(b) Distribution of transition probability

Fig. 10 Difference between information entropy space and
transition probability space for RS232 T1000 benchmark.

Table 4 Results of manual check.
Circuit
MinPts
r
TPR (%)
TNR (%)
RS232 T1000
2
0.05
62
99
5
0.04
67
99
RS232 T1100
RS232 T1200
5
0.04
89
99
2
0.05
89
99
RS232 T1300
5
0.04
61
99
RS232 T1400
5
0.04
73
99
RS232 T1500
5
0.04
62
99
RS232 T1600
4
0.05
96
99
s15850 T100
5
0.05
93
99
s35932 T200
4
0.05
100
99
s38417 T100

Positive Rate (TPR), i.e., the number of Trojan logics
correctly detected as a percentage of the total number
of Trojan logics. We also provide the True Negative
Rate (TNR) results, which tell us the ratio of the true
negatives over the number of non-Trojan logics. The
False Positive Rate (FPR) is the fraction of logics that
are falsely ﬂagged as being suspicious Trojan logics,
which is equal to 1-TNR. It can be seen that the HTDet
can effectively detect Trojan logics of CUD with the
extremely low false positives.
We also analyzed the effect of parameters MinPts and
r on the HT detection performance. The experimental
results indicate that the appropriate values of parameters
are also necessary for Trojan detection. Taking
RS232 T1000 as an example, when r was ﬁxed to 0.05,
both TPR and TNR declined as MinPts increased, as
shown in Fig. 11a. This is because the number of noise
point gradually increased with MinPts. Similarly, when
MinPts was ﬁxed to 5 and r increased, the TPR gradually
declined but the TNR was almost constant, as shown in
Fig. 11b. This is because all data points were clustered
as normal logics when r was equal to 0.06 or 0.07.
6.3

Comparison with existing methods

We compared the experimental results with existing
supervised learning methods[23–25] , which include the
support vector machine, multi-layer neural network
and random forest, to detect HT. Table 5 summarizes
the results. Compared with the methods proposed in
Refs. [23] and [24], HTDet could greatly improve the
TNR, although the obtained TPR was slightly reduced.
Compared with the method in Ref. [25], HTDet could
improve the average TPR by 4.7% and had more stable
experimental results. It can be seen that the HTDet could
obtain 79% average TPR and 99% average TNR, which
is a better trade-off between TPR and TNR.
We also compared the experimental results with
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(b) Effect of r on TPR and TNR

(a) Effect of MinPts on TPR and TNR

Fig. 11
Table 5

Circuit
RS232 T1000
RS232 T1100
RS232 T1200
RS232 T1300
RS232 T1400
RS232 T1500
RS232 T1600
s15850 T100
s35932 T200
s38417 T100
Average
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Parameter analysis on RS232 T1000 benchmark.
Comparison with the supervised learning methods.

(%)
TPR
TNR
Method in [23] Method in [24] Method in [25] HTDet Method in [23] Method in [24] Method in [25] HTDet
53
100
100
62
31
24
99
99
58
78
50
67
27
25
99
99
80
91
88
89
26
55
100
99
89
86
100
89
26
65
100
99
83
100
98
61
22
15
100
99
83
82
95
73
24
47
99
99
89
97
93
62
26
28
99
99
93
81
78
96
66
96
100
99
100
67
8.3
93
59
88
100
99
100
83
33
100
76
98
100
99
39
54
99.6
99
83
86.5
74.3
79

other simulation-based methods[29, 30] . An HT detection
method based on functional analysis is proposed in
Ref. [29], and an HT detection method based on signal
correlation is proposed in Ref. [30]. Table 6 presents the
results. The HTDet does not need the “golden circuit”
since it is an unsupervised learning method, but it can
obtain better HT detection performance in order to
achieve a good trade-off between TPR and TNR.
In this study, we did not attempt to ﬁnd all Trojan
logics, but tried to ﬁnd the set of most suspicious logics,
which can effectively reduce the authentication time.
In addition, a manual check after the automatic HT
detection is always necessary.
Table 6 Comparison with the other methods: “-” indicates
that the result is not clear.
(%)
TPR
TNP
Circuit
Method Method
Method Method
HTDet
HTDet
group
in [29] in [30]
in [29] in [30]
RS232
72
92

99
99
99
99
s15850
61
96
99
99
99
s35932
27
93
99
99
99
s38417
100
100

6.4

Effectiveness analysis
generation method

of

test

pattern

We selected three typical circuit benchmarks
(RS232 T1000, RS232 T1100, and s15850 T100)
to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed test
pattern generation method. In these three benchmarks,
the Trojan trigger was the combinational structure,
the sequential structure, and the hybrid structure,
respectively. Let the transition of each suspicious logic
swi be tri during the simulation, where swi 2 SW, and
i D 1; 2; : : : ; t. Let trmaxbeıthe
 maximum of tri . Let
Pt
trave be equal to i D1 tri t . Then, the maximum
transition and average transition are used to measure the
effectiveness of test patterns. After obtaining SCPIs, we
set all the primary inputs, which are not in the SCPIs,
at logic 0 or logic 1. For the primary inputs in the
SCPIs, we still generated full-random stimuli to perform
simulation. After 106 cycles of simulation, the obtained
transitions of suspicious Trojan logics are summarized
in Table 7.
It can be seen that the proposed test pattern generation
method could effectively increase the maximum

58
Table 7 Transitions comparison: “Before *” indicates fullrandom test stimuli and “After *” indicates constrainedrandom test stimuli using our approach.
Circuit
trmax
trave
Before RS232 T1000
722
224.67
After RS232 T1000
768
230.89
719
224.39
Before RS232 T1100
746
231.56
After RS232 T1100
716
64.19
Before s15850 T100
954
96.48
After s15850 T100

transition and average transition of these suspicious
Trojan logics, which means that it can reduce the
activation time.

7

Related Work

Hardware Trojan detection is a challenging problem.
Lots of studies on HT detection have been conducted in
the past decades, and they can be roughly classiﬁed into
reverse engineering, side-channel analysis, GLIFT-based
technique, static structure analysis, statistical feature
analysis, and functional testing.
Bao et al.[10, 11] proposed that using reverse
engineering to dissect the chip under detection can
guarantee the detection of any malicious modiﬁcations
in the chip. However, the cost of this method is too
much, as it takes several weeks to analyze the chip under
detection; hence, the reverse engineering method can
only be applied to the ICs with small scale and simple
structure.
In side-channel analysis[12–18] , the impacts of HTs
(e.g., circuit delay, transient current, leakage power, and
heat analysis) are used to detect whether HTs are present
in the CUD. However, the circuit is more susceptible to
process variations and environmental noise due to the
present nanoscale technologies.
GLIFT-based Trojan detection methods rely on
gate-level information ﬂow tracking to perform HT
detection[19–21] . In GLIFT, each data bit is associated
with a taint bit, and the data propagation is monitored by
tracking the taint bits as they ﬂow through Boolean gates.
To track the propagation of taint bits, each standard cell
gate is augmented with its corresponding tracking logic
gate (referred to as GLIFT logic). However, the GLIFT
logic generation is a difﬁcult problem due to its inherent
complexity. Moreover, GLIFT logic can produce false
positive results[20] .
A score-based classiﬁcation method has been
proposed for identifying HTs in CUD[22] . This technique
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comprehensively analyzes the characteristics of Trojan
logics introduced at TrustHub[37] , and then uses a
strategy of conditional judgment for HT detection.
Hasegawa et al. proposed learning structure features
for Trojan detection[23–25] . For this purpose, support
vector machine, multi-layer neural network, and random
forest were applied to learn circuit structure features,
seperately. In Ref. [26], the triggering characteristics
of Trojan circuits are summarized, and a feature
analysis technique based on ﬂip-ﬂop level information
ﬂow graph is proposed. Moreover, a multilevel HT
detection framework, that combines ﬂip-ﬂop level and
combinational logic level structure feature analysis, has
been proposed[27] . Reference [28] analyzes the time
to generate a transition in functional Trojans. The
transition is modeled by geometric distribution, and
the number of clock cycles required to generate a
transition is estimated. FANCI[29] considers that between
Trojan logic and normal logic, a signiﬁcant difference
exists in the input-to-output dependency; thus, it ﬂags
logics that have weak input-to-output dependency as
suspicious Trojan logics by Boolean function analysis.
In Ref. [30], an HT detection method using signal
correlation is proposed. It basically estimates the
statistical correlation between signals in a circuit for
Trojan detection with the use of ordering points to
identify the clustering structure algorithm. Furthermore,
Ref. [31] proposed a reference-free HT detection
scheme based on controllability and observability. This
paper indicates that the characteristics of controllability
and observability between Trojan gates and genuine
gates have signiﬁcant difference. In Ref. [32], an HT
detection approach using natural language processing
technology is proposed. It considers that design teams
of commercial chips will have a speciﬁc design style
due to the existence of established design speciﬁcations;
therefore, the statistical method can be used to detect
abnormal circuit logics.
Functional
testing-based
HT
detection
approaches[33–36] try to generate random test patterns to
activate the HTs in CUD. If the logical values of primary
outputs do not match the correct results, a Trojan is
detected. The primary challenge of the functional
testing-based method is that the Trojan circuit is much
smaller than the original circuit, and HTs usually have a
dormant nature. Hence, detecting potential HTs in CUD
by traditional functional testing is difﬁcult.
Different from the traditional functional veriﬁcation
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approaches, HTDet is a novel HT detection technique
based on information entropy. We consider that the
Trojan is usually inserted in the regions with low
controllability and low observability in order to maintain
high concealment, which will result in the Trojan
logics featuring extremely low transitions during the
simulation. Our approach does not require pushing
the Trojan logic to the triggering state. As long as the
information entropies of circuit logics are extremely low,
the HTDet can ﬂag them as suspicious Trojan logics
based on the density-reachable relationship. Although
the information theory has been applied in many ﬁelds,
to the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst attempt to
use the information theory technology to detect HTs in a
hardware design.
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Conclusion

In this paper, we propose a novel HT detection method
called HTDet, which can effectively distinguish Trojan
logics and normal logics using the information entropy
technique. The HTDet is an unsupervised learning
method and can quickly ﬁnd suspicious Trojan logics
without the “golden circuit”. The HTDet does not need
to trigger the Trojan logics during the simulation, and
it ﬂags circuit logics with extremely low information
entropy as suspicious Trojan logics. In addition, we
develop a heuristic method to increase the transitions
of suspicious Trojan logics using mutual information.
The experimental results demonstrate that the HTDet
can obtain 79% average TPR and 99% average TNR,
which is a better trade-off between TPR and TNR. In
the future, we aim to study the automatic selection
of parameters (r and MinPts) to achieve the optimal
experimental performance. Moreover, we will study the
method that can effectively detect newer HTs designs.
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